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Fig. 1. Alan Turing (image source [Ima13])
“And when it comes to mathematics, you must realize that this is the human
mind at the extreme limit of its capacity.” (H. Robbins)
“. . . so reduce the use of the brain and calculate!” (E. W. Dijkstra)
“The fact that a brain can do it seems to suggest that the difficulties [of trying
with a machine] may not really be so bad as they now seem.” (A. Turing)
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21 Computer Calculation
1.1 a panorama of the status quo
Where stands the mathematical endeavor?
In 2012, many mathematical utilities are reaching consolidation. It is an age of
large aggregates and large repositories of mathematics: the arXiv, Math Reviews, and
euDML, which promises to aggregate the many European archives such as Zentralblatt
Math and Numdam. Sage aggregates dozens of mathematically oriented computer pro-
grams under a single Python-scripted front-end.
Book sales in the U.S. have been dropping for the past several years. Instead, online
sources such as Wikipedia and Math Overflow are rapidly becoming students’ preferred
math references. The Polymath blog organizes massive mathematical collaborations.
Other blogs organize previously isolated researchers into new fields of research. The
slow, methodical deliberations of referees in the old school are giving way; now in a
single stroke, Tao blogs, gets feedback, and publishes.
Machine Learning is in its ascendancy. LogAnswer and Wolfram Alpha answer our
elementary questions about the quantitative world; Watson our Jeopardy questions.
Google Page ranks our searches by calculating the largest eigenvalue of the largest ma-
trix the world has ever known. Deep Blue plays our chess games. The million-dollar-
prize-winning Pragmatic Chaos algorithm enhances our Netflix searches. The major
proof assistants now contain tens of thousands of formal proofs that are being mined
for hints about how to prove the next generation of theorems.
Mathematical models and algorithms rule the quantitative world. Without applied
mathematics, we would be bereft of Shor’s factorization algorithm for quantum com-
puters, Yang-Mills theories of strong interactions in physics, invisibility cloaks, Radon
transforms for medical imaging, models of epidemiology, risk analysis in insurance,
stochastic pricing models of financial derivatives, RSA encryption of sensitive data,
Navier-Stokes modeling of fluids, and models of climate change. Without it, entire
fields of engineering from Control Engineering to Operations Research would close
their doors. The early icon of mathematical computing, Von Neumann, divided his final
years between meteorology and hydrogen bomb calculations. Today, applications fuel
the economy: in 2011 rankings, the first five of the “10 best jobs” are math or computer
related: software engineer, mathematician, actuary, statistician, and computer systems
analyst [CC111].
Computers have rapidly become so pervasive in mathematics that future generations
may look back to this day as a golden dawn. A comprehensive survey is out of the
question. It would almost be like asking for a summary of applications of symmetry to
mathematics. Computability – like symmetry – is a wonderful structural property that
some mathematical objects possess that makes answers flow more readily wherever it is
found. This section gives many examples that give a composite picture of computers in
mathematical research, showing that computers are neither the panacea that the public
at large might imagine, nor the evil that the mathematical purist might fear. I have
deliberately selected many examples from pure mathematics, partly because of my own
background and partly to correct the conventional wisdom that couples computers with
applied mathematics and blackboards with pure mathematics.
31.2 Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture
I believe that the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture is the deepest conjecture ever
to be formulated with the help of a computer [BSD65]. The Clay Institute has offered a
one-million dollar prize to anyone who settles it.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined by an equation y2 = x3 + ax + b over the field of
rational numbers. Motivated by related quantities in Siegel’s work on quadratic forms,
Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer set out to estimate the quantity∏
Np/p, (1)
where Np is the number of rational points on E modulo p, and the product extends
over primes p ≤ P [Bir02]. Performing experiments on the EDSAC II computer at
the Computer laboratory at Cambridge University during the years 1958–1962, they
observed that as P increases, the products (1) grow asymptotically in P as
c(E) logr P,
for some constant c, where r is the Mordell-Weil rank of E; that is, the maximum
number of independent points of infinite order in the group E(Q) of rational points.
Following the suggestions of Cassels and Davenport, they reformulated this numerical
asymptotic law in terms of the zeta function L(E, s) of the elliptic curve. Thanks to the
work of Wiles and subsequent extensions of that work, it is known that L(E, s) is an
entire function of the complex variable s. The Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture
asserts that the rank r of an elliptic curve over Q is equal to the order of the zero of
L(E, s) at s = 1.
A major (computer-free) recent theorem establishes that the Birch and Swinnerton-
Dyer conjecture holds for a positive proportion of all elliptic curves over Q [BS10].
This result, although truly spectacular, is mildly misleading in the sense that the elliptic
curves of high rank rarely occur but pose the greatest difficulties.
1.3 Sato-Tate
The Sato-Tate conjecture is another major conjecture about elliptic curves that was
discovered by computer. If E is an elliptic curve with rational coefficients
y2 = x3 + ax + b,
then the number of solutions modulo a prime number p (including the point at infinity)
has the form
1 + p − 2√p cos θp.
for some real number 0 ≤ θp ≤ pi. In 1962, Sato, Nagashima, and Namba made cal-
culations of θp on a Hitachi HIPAC 103 computer to understand how these numbers
are distributed as p varies for a fixed elliptic curve E [Sch]. By the spring of 1963, the
evidence suggested sin2 θ as a good fit of the data (Figure 2). That is, if P(n) is the set
of the first n primes, and f : [0, pi]→ R is any smooth test function, then for large n,
1
n
∑
p∈P(n)
f (θp) tends to
2
pi
∫ pi
0
f (θ) sin2 θ dθ.
4Fig. 2. Data leading to the Sato-Tate conjecture (image source [SN])
The Sato-Tate conjecture (1963) predicts that this same distribution is obtained, no
matter the elliptic curve, provided the curve does not have complex multiplication. Tate,
who arrived at the conjecture independently, did so without computer calculations.
Serre interpreted Sato-Tate as a generalization of Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in
arithmetic progression, and gave a proof strategy of generalizing the analytic proper-
ties of L-functions used in the proof of Dirichlet’s theorem [Ser68]. Indeed, a complete
proof of Sato-Tate conjecture has now been found and is based on extremely deep an-
alytic properties of L-functions [Car07]. The proof of the Sato-Tate conjecture and its
generalizations has been one of the most significant recent advances in number theory.
1.4 transient uses of computers
It has become common for problems in mathematics to be first verified by computer and
later confirmed without them. Some examples are the construction of sporadic groups,
counterexamples to a conjecture of Euler, the proof of the Catalan conjecture, and the
discovery of a formula for the binary digits of pi.
Perhaps the best known example is the construction of sporadic groups as part of
the monumental classification of finite simple groups. The sporadic groups are the 26
finite simple groups that do not fall into natural infinite families. For example, Lyons
5(1972) predicted the existence of a sporadic group of order
28 · 37 · 56 · 7 · 11 · 31 · 37 · 67.
In 1973, Sims proved the existence of this group in a long unpublished manuscript that
relied on many specialized computer programs. By 1999 , the calculations had become
standardized in group theory packages, such as GAP and Magma [HS99]. Eventually,
computer-free existence and uniqueness proofs were found [MC02], [AS92].
Another problem in finite group theory with a computational slant is the inverse
Galois problem: is every subgroup of the symmetric group S n the Galois group of a
polynomial of degree n with rational coefficients? In the 1980s Malle and Matzat used
computers to realize many groups as Galois groups [MM99], but with an infinite list of
finite groups to choose from, non-computational ideas have been more fruitful, such as
Hilbert irreducibility, rigidity, and automorphic representations [KLS08].
Euler conjectured (1769) that a fourth power cannot be the sum of three positive
fourth powers, that a fifth power cannot be the sum of four positive fifth powers, and
so forth. In 1966, a computer search [LP66] on a CDC 6600 mainframe uncovered a
counterexample
275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 = 1445,
which can be checked by hand (I dare you). The two-sentence announcement of this
counterexample qualifies as one of the shortest mathematical publications of all times.
Twenty years later, a more subtle computer search gave another counterexample [Elk88]:
26824404 + 153656394 + 187967604 = 206156734.
The Catalan conjecture (1844) asserts that the only solution to the equation
xm − yn = 1,
in positive integers x, y,m, n with exponents m, n greater than 1 is the obvious
32 − 23 = 1.
That is, 8 and 9 are the only consecutive positive perfect powers. By the late 1970s,
Baker’s methods in diophantine analysis had reduced the problem to an astronomically
large and hopelessly infeasible finite computer search. Miha˘ilescu’s proof (2002) of the
Catalan conjecture made light use of computers (a one-minute calculation), and later
the computer calculations were entirely eliminated [Mih04], [Met03].
Bailey, Borwein, and Plouffe found an algorithm for calculating the nth binary digit
of pi directly: it jumps straight to the nth digit without first calculating any of the earlier
digits. They understood that to design such an algorithm, they would need an infinite
series for pi in which powers of 2 controlled the denominators. They did not know of any
such formula, and made a computer search (using the PSLQ lattice reduction algorithm)
for any series of the desired form. Their search unearthed a numerical identity
pi =
∞∑
n=0
(
4
8n + 1
− 2
8n + 4
− 1
8n + 5
− 1
8n + 6
) (
1
16
)n
,
which was then rigorously proved and used to implement their binary-digits algorithm.
61.5 Rogers-Ramanujan identities
The famous Rogers-Ramanujan identities
1 +
∞∑
k=1
qk
2+ak
(1 − q)(1 − q2) · · · (1 − qk) =
∞∏
j=0
1
(1 − q5 j+a+1)(1 − q5 j−a+4) , a = 0, 1.
can now be proved by an almost entirely mechanical procedure from Jacobi’s triple
product identity and the q-WZ algorithm of Wilf and Zeilberger that checks identi-
ties of q-hypergeometric finite sums [Pau94]. Knuth’s foreword to a book on the WZ
method opens, “Science is what we understand well enough to explain to a computer.
Art is everything else we do.” Through the WZ method, many summation identities
have become a science [PWZ96].
1.6 packing tetrahedra
Aristotle erroneously believed that regular tetrahedra tile space: “It is agreed that there
are only three plane figures which can fill a space, the triangle, the square, and the
hexagon, and only two solids, the pyramid and the cube” [AriBC]. However, centuries
later, when the dihedral angle of the regular tetrahedron was calculated:
arccos(1/3) ≈ 1.23 < 1.25664 ≈ 2pi/5,
it was realized that a small gap is left when five regular tetrahedra are grouped around a
common edge (Figure 3). In 1900, in his famous list of problems, Hilbert asked “How
can one arrange most densely in space an infinite number of equal solids of given form,
e.g., spheres with given radii or regular tetrahedra . . . ?”
Fig. 3. Regular tetrahedra fail to tile space (image source [Doy11]).
Aristotle notwithstanding, until recently, no arrangements of regular tetrahedra with
high density were known to exist. In 2000, Betke and Henk developed an efficient com-
puter algorithm to find the densest lattice packing of a general convex body [BH00].
This opened the door to experimentation [CT06]. For example, the algorithm can deter-
mine the best lattice packing of the convex hull of the cluster of tetrahedra in Figure 3.
In rapid succession came new record-breaking arrangements of tetrahedra, culminating
in what is now conjectured to be the best possible [CEG10]. (See Figure 4.) Although
Chen had the panache to hand out Dungeons and Dragons tetrahedral dice to the audi-
ence for a hands-on modeling session during her thesis defense, the best arrangement
7was found using Monte Carlo experiments. In the numerical simulations, a finite num-
ber of tetrahedra are randomly placed in a box of variable shape. The tetrahedra are
jiggled as the box slowly shrinks until no further improvement is possible. Now that a
precise conjecture has been formulated, the hardest part still remains: to give a proof.
Fig. 4. The best packing of tetrahedra is believed to be the Chen-Engel-Glotzer arrangement with
density 4000/4671 ≈ 0.856 (image source [CEG10]).
1.7 the Kepler conjecture
Hilbert’s 18th problem asks to find dense packings of both spheres and regular tetra-
hedra. The problem of determining the best sphere packing in three dimensions is the
Kepler conjecture. Kepler was led to the idea of density as an organizing principle in
nature by observing the tightly packed seeds in a pomegranate. Reflecting on the hexag-
onal symmetry of snowflakes and honeycombs, by capping each honeycomb cell with
a lid of the same shape as the base of the cell, he constructed a closed twelve-sided cell
that tiles space. Kepler observed that the familiar pyramidal cannonball arrangement is
obtained when a sphere is placed in each capped honeycomb cell (Figure 5). This he
believed to be the densest packing.
L. Fejes To´th proposed a strategy to prove Kepler’s conjecture in the 1950s, and later
he suggested that computers might be used. The proof, finally obtained by Ferguson and
me in 1998, is one of the most difficult nonlinear optimization problems ever rigorously
solved by computer [Hal05b]. The computers calculations originally took about 2000
hours to run on Sparc workstations. Recent simplifications in the proof have reduced
the runtime to about 20 hours and have reduced the amount of customized code by a
factor of more than 10.
1.8 the four-color theorem
The four-color theorem is the most celebrated computer proof in the history of mathe-
matics. The problem asserts that it is possible to color the countries of any map with at
8Fig. 5. An optimal sphere packing is obtained by placing one sphere in each three-dimensional
honeycomb cell (image source [RhD11]).
most four colors in such a way that contiguous countries receive different colors. The
proof of this theorem required about 1200 hours on an IBM 370-168 in 1976. So much
has been written about Appel and Haken’s computer solution to this problem that it is
pointless to repeat it here [AHK77]. Let it suffice to cite a popular account [Wil02], a
sociological perspective [Mac01], the second generation proof [RSST97], and the cul-
minating formal verification [Gon08].
1.9 projective planes
A finite projective plane of order n > 1 is defined to be a set of n2 + n + 1 lines and
n2 + n + 1 points with the following properties:
1. Every line contains n + 1 points;
2. Every point is on n + 1 lines;
3. Every two distinct lines have exactly one point of intersection;
4. Every two distinct points lie on exactly one line.
Fig. 6. The Fano plane is a finite projective plane of order 2.
9The definition is an abstraction of properties that evidently hold for P2(Fq), the pro-
jective plane over a finite field Fq, with q = n, for any prime power q. In particular, a
finite projective plane exists whenever n is a positive power of a prime number (Fig-
ure 6).
The conjecture is that every finite projective plane of order n > 1 is a prime power.
The smallest integers n > 1 that are not prime powers are
6, 10, 12, 14, 15, . . .
The brute force approach to this conjecture is to eliminate each of these possibilities
in turn. The case n = 6 was settled in 1938. Building on a number of theoretical ad-
vances [MST73], Lam eliminated the case n = 10 in 1989, in one of the most difficult
computer proofs in history [LTS89]. This calculation was executed over a period of
years on multiple machines and eventually totaled about 2000 hours of Cray-1A time.
Unlike the computer proof of the four-color theorem, the projective plane proof has
never received independent verification. Because of the possibilities of programming
errors and soft errors (see Section 3.5), Lam is unwilling to call his result a proof. He
writes, “From personal experience, it is extremely easy to make programming mistakes.
We have taken many precautions, . . . Yet, I want to emphasize that this is only an ex-
perimental result and it desperately needs an independent verification, or better still, a
theoretical explanation” [Lam91].
Recent speculation at Math Overflow holds that the next case, n = 12, remains
solidly out of computational reach [Hor10].
1.10 hyperbolic manifolds
Computers have helped to resolve a number of open conjectures about hyperbolic man-
ifolds (defined as complete Riemannian manifolds with constant negative sectional cur-
vature −1), including the proof that the space of hyperbolic metrics on a closed hyper-
bolic 3-manifold is contractible [GMT03], [Gab10].
1.11 chaos theory and strange attractors
The theory of chaos has been one of the great success stories of twentieth century math-
ematics and science. Turing1 expressed the notion of chaos with these words, “quite
small errors in the initial conditions can have an overwhelming effect at a later time.
The displacement of a single electron by a billionth of a centimetre at one moment
might make the difference between a man being killed by an avalanche a year later,
or escaping” [Tur50]. Later, the metaphor became a butterfly that stirs up a tornado in
Texas by flapping its wings in Brazil.
Thirteen years later, Lorenz encountered chaos as he ran weather simulations on a
Royal McBee LGP-30 computer [Lor63]. When he reran an earlier numerical solution
with what he thought to be identical initial data, he obtained wildly different results.
1 For early history, see [Wol02, p. 971]. Turing vainly hoped that digital computers might be
insulated from the effects of chaos.
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He eventually traced the divergent results to a slight discrepancy in initial conditions
caused by rounding in the printout. The Lorenz oscillator is the simplified form of
Lorenz’s original ordinary differential equations.
A set A is attracting if it has a neighborhood U such that
A =
⋂
t≥0
ft(U),
where ft(x) is the solution of the dynamical system (in present case the Lorenz oscil-
lator) at time t with initial condition x. That is, U flows towards the attracting set A.
Simulations have discovered attracting sets with strange properties such as non-integral
Hausdorff dimension and the tendency for a small slab of volume to quickly spread
throughout the attractor.
Fig. 7. The Lorenz oscillator gives one of the most famous images of mathematics, a strange
attractor in dynamical systems (image source [Aga13]).
Lorenz conjectured in 1963 that his oscillator has a strange attractor (Figure 7). In
1982, the Lax report cited soliton theory and strange attractors as two prime examples of
the “discovery of new phenomena through numerical experimentation,” and calls such
discovery perhaps the most “significant application of scientific computing” [Lax82].
Smale, in his list of 18 “Mathematical Problems for the Next Century” made the four-
teenth problem to present a rigorous proof that the dynamics of the Lorenz oscillator is
a strange attractor [Sma98] with various additional properties that make it a “geometric
Lorenz attractor.”
Tucker has solved Smale’s fourteenth problem by computer [Tuc02] [Ste00]. One
particularly noteworthy aspect of this work is that chaotic systems, by their very na-
ture, pose particular hardships for rigorous computer analysis. Nevertheless, Tucker
implemented the classical Euler method for solving ordinary differential equations with
particular care, using interval arithmetic to give mathematically rigorous error bounds.
Tucker has been awarded numerous prizes for this work, including the Moore Prize
(2002) and the EMS Prize (2004).
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Smale’s list in general envisions a coming century in which computer science, es-
pecially computational complexity, plays a much larger role than during the past cen-
tury. He finishes the list with the open-ended philosophical problem that echoes Turing:
“What are the limits of intelligence, both artificial and human?”
1.12 4/3
Mandelbrot’s conjectures in fractal geometry have resulted in two Fields Medals. Here
he describes the discovery of the 4/3-conjecture made in [Man82]. “The notion that
these conjectures might have been reached by pure thought – with no picture – is sim-
ply inconceivable.. . . I had my programmer draw a very big sample [Brownian] motion
and proceeded to play with it.” He goes on to describe computer experiments that led
him to enclose the Brownian motion into black clusters that looked to him like islands
with jagged coastlines (Figure 8). “[I]nstantly, my long previous experience with the
coastlines of actual islands on Earth came handy and made me suspect that the bound-
ary of Brownian motion has a fractal dimension equal to 4/3” [Man04].
This conjecture, which Mandelbrot’s trained eye spotted in an instant, took 18 years
to prove [LSW01].
402 GREGORY F. LAWLER, ODED SCHRAMM, AND WENDELIN WERNER
Figure 1. Simulation of a planar Brownian path
it had been established that the dimension of the frontier, cut points, and pio-
neer points are 2 − ξ(2, 0), 2 − ξ(1, 1), and 2 − ξ(1, 0), respectively. Duplantier
and Kwon [4] were the first to conjecture the values ξ(1, 1) = 5/4, ξ(1, 0) = 1/4
using ideas from conformal field theory. Duplantier has also developed another
non-rigorous approach to these results based on “quantum gravity” (see e.g. [3]).
For a more complete list of references and background, see e.g. [9].
2. Intersection exponents
Let B1, B2, . . . , Bj+k be independent planar Brownian motions with uni-
formly distributed starting points on the unit circle. Let T lR denote the first
time at which Bl reaches the circle of radius R, and let ωjR = B
j [0, T jR]. The
intersection exponent ξ(j, k) is defined by the relation
P
[
(ω1R ∪ · · · ∪ ωjR) ∩ (ωj+1R ∪ · · · ∪ ωj+kR ) = ∅
] ≈ R−ξ(j,k), R→∞,
where f ≈ g means lim(log f/ log g) = 1. Using subadditivity, it is not hard to
see that there are constants ξ(j, k) satisfying this relation. Let
ZR = ZR(ω
1
R, . . . ,ω
j
R) := P[ (ω
1
R ∪ · · · ∪ ωjR) ∩ ωj+1R = ∅ | ω1R, . . . ,ωjR ].
Then
E[ZkR] ≈ R−ξ(j,k), R→∞.(2.1)
In the latter formulation, there is no need to restrict to integer k; this defines
ξ(j,λ) for all λ > 0. The existence of these exponents is also very easy to
Fig. 8. A simulation of planar Brownian motion. Mandelbrot used “visual inspection supported
by computer experiments” to formulate deep conjectures in fractal geometry (image generated
from source code at [LSW01]).
1.13 sphere ev rsion visualizat on
Smale (1958) proved that it is possible to turn a sphere inside out without introducing
any creases.2 For long time, this paradoxic l result defied the intuition of experts.
R. Bott, who had been Smale’s graduate advisor, refused to believe it at first. Levy
writes that trying to visualize Smale’s mathematical argument “is akin to describing
2 I am fond of this example, because The Scientific American article [Phi66] about this theorem
was my first exposure to “real mathematics” as a child.
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what happens to the ingredients of a souffle´ in minute detail, down to the molecular
chemistry, and expecting someone who has never seen a souffle´ to follow this ‘recipe’
in preparing the dish” [Lev95].
Fig. 9. Computer-generated stages of a sphere eversion (image source [Op111]).
It is better to see and taste a souffle´ first. The computer videos of this theorem
are spectacular. Watch them on YouTube! As we watch the sphere turn inside out, our
intuition grows. The computer calculations behind the animations of the first video (the
Optiverse) start with a sphere, half inverted and half right-side out [SFL]. From halfway
position, the path of steepest descent of an energy functional is used to calculate the
unfolding in both directions to the round spheres, with one fully inverted (Figure 9). The
second video is based on Thurston’s “corrugations” [LMM94]. As the name suggests,
this sphere eversion has undulating ruffles that dance like a jellyfish, but avoids sharp
creases. Through computers, understanding.
Speaking of Thurston, he contrasts “our amazingly rich abilities to absorb geometric
information and the weakness of our innate abilities to convey spatial ideas.. . . We ef-
fortlessly look at a two-dimensional picture and reconstruct a three-dimensional scene,
but we can hardly draw them accurately” [Pit11]. As more and more mathematics mi-
grates to the computer, there is a danger that geometrical intuition becomes buried under
a logical symbolism.
13
1.14 minimal surface visualization
Weber and Wolf [WW11] report that the use of computer visualization has become
“commonplace” in minimal surface research, “a conversation between visual aspects
of the minimal surfaces and advancing theory, each supporting the other.” This started
when computer illustrations of the Costa surface (a particular minimal surface, Fig-
ure 10) in the 1980s revealed dihedral symmetries of the surface that were not seen
directly from its defining equations. The observation of symmetry turned out to be the
key to the proof that the Costa surface is an embedding. The symmetries further led to
a conjecture and then proof of the existence of other minimal surfaces of higher genus
with similar dihedral symmetries. As Hoffman wrote about his discoveries, “The im-
ages produced along the way were the objects that we used to make discoveries. They
are an integral part of the process of doing mathematics, not just a way to convey a
discovery made without their use” [Hof87].
Fig. 10. The Costa surface launched an era of computer exploration in minimal surface theory
(image source [San12]).
1.15 double bubble conjecture
Closely related to minimal surfaces are surfaces of constant mean curvature. The mean
curvature of a minimal surface is zero; surfaces whose mean curvature is constant are
a slight generalization. They arise as surfaces that are minimal subject to the constraint
that they enclose a region of fixed volume. Soap bubble films are surfaces of constant
mean curvature.
The isoperimetric inequality asserts that the sphere minimizes the surface area among
all surfaces that enclose a region of fixed volume. The double bubble problem is the
generalization of the isoperimetric inequality to two enclosed volumes. What is the sur-
face minimizing way to enclose two separate regions of fixed volume? In the nineteenth
century, Boys [Boy90] and Plateau observed experimentally that the answer should be
two partial spherical bubbles joined along a shared flat disk (Figure 11). The size of the
14
shared disk is determined by the condition that angles should be 120◦ where the three
surfaces meet. This is the double bubble conjecture.
The first case of double bubble conjecture to be established was that of two equal
volumes [HHS95]. The proof was a combination of conventional analysis and computer
proof. Conventional analysis (geometric measure theory) established the existence of a
minimizer and reduced the possibilities to a small number of figures of revolution, and
computers were to analyze each of the cases, showing in each case by interval analysis
either that the case was not a local minimizer or that its area was strictly larger than
the double bubble. Later theorems proved the double bubble conjecture in the general
unequal volume case without the use of computers [HMRR00].
Fig. 11. The optimality of a double bubble was first established by computer, using interval anal-
ysis (image source [Tsi13]).
The natural extension of the double bubble conjecture from two bubbles to an in-
finite bubbly foam is the Kelvin problem. The problem asks for the surface area mini-
mizing partition of Euclidean space into cells of equal volume. Kelvin’s conjecture – a
tiling by slight perturbations of truncated octahedra – remained the best known partition
until a counterexample was constructed by two physicists, Phelan and Weaire in 1993
(Figure 12). The counterexample exists not as a physical model, nor as an exact mathe-
matical formula, but only as an image generated from a triangular mesh in the Surface
Evolver computer program. By default, the counterexample has become the new con-
jectural answer to the Kelvin problem, which I fully expect to be proved someday by
computer.
1.16 kissing numbers
In the plane, at most six pennies can be arranged in a hexagon so that they all touch one
more penny placed at the center of the hexagon (Figure 13). Odlyzko and Sloane, solved
the corresponding problem in dimension 8: at most 240 nonoverlapping congruent balls
can be arranged so that they all touch one more at the center.
Up to rotation, a unique arrangement of 240 exists. To the cognoscenti, the proof of
this fact is expressed as one-line certificate:
(t − 1
2
)t2(t +
1
2
)2(t + 1).
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Fig. 12. The Phelan-Weaire foam, giving the best known partition of Euclidean space into cells
of equal volume, was constructed with Surface Evolver software. This foam inspired the bubble
design of the Water Cube building in the 2008 Beijing Olympics (image source [PW111]).
Fig. 13. In two dimensions, the kissing number is 6. In eight dimensions, the answer is 240. The
proof certificate was found by linear programming.
(For an explanation of the certificates, see [PZ04].) The certificate was produced by a
linear programming computer search, but once the certificate is in hand, the proof is
computer-free.
As explained above, six is the kissing number in two dimensions, 240 is the kissing
number in eight dimensions. In three dimensions, the kissing number is 12. This three-
dimensional problem goes back to a discussion between Newton and Gregory in 1694,
but was not settled until the 1950s. A recent computer proof makes an exhaustive search
through nearly 100 million combinatorial possibilities to determine exactly how much
the twelve spheres must shrink to accommodate a thirteenth [MT10]. Bachoc and Val-
lentin were recently awarded the SIAG/Optimization prize for their use of semi-definite
programming algorithms to establish new proofs of the kissing number in dimensions
3, 4, 8 and new bounds on the kissing number in various other dimensions [BV08].
16
1.17 digression on E8
It is no coincidence that the calculation of Odlyzko and Sloane works in dimension 8.
Wonderful things happen in eight dimensional space and again in 24 dimensions.
Having mentioned the 240 balls in eight dimensions, I cannot resist mentioning
some further computer proofs. The centers of the 240 balls are vectors whose integral
linear combinations generate a lattice in R8, known as the E8 lattice (Figure 14).
There is a packing of congruent balls in eight dimensions that is obtained by center-
ing one ball at each vector in the E8 lattice, making the balls as large as possible without
overlap. Everyone believes that this packing in eight dimensions is the densest possible,
but this fact currently defies proof. If the center of the balls are the points of a lattice,
then the packing is called a lattice packing. Cohn and Kumar have a beautiful computer
assisted proof that the E8 packing is the densest of all lattice packings in R8 (and the
corresponding result in dimension 24 for the Leech lattice). The proof is based on the
Poisson summation formula. Pfender and Ziegler’s account of this computer-assisted
proof won the Chauvenet Prize of the MAA for writing [PZ04].
Fig. 14. The E8 lattice is generated by eight vectors in R8 whose mutual angles are 120◦ or 90◦
depending on whether the corresponding dots are joined by a segment are not.
The 240 vectors that generate the E8 lattice are the roots of a 240+8 dimensional Lie
group (also called E8); that is, a differentiable manifold that has the analytic structure of
a group. All simple Lie groups were classified in the nineteenth century.3 They fall into
infinite families named alphabetically, An, Bn, Cn, Dn, with 5 more exceptional cases
that do not fall into infinite families E6, E7 E8, F4, G2. The exceptional Lie group4 of
highest dimension is E8.
The long-term Atlas Project aims to use computers to determine all unitary repre-
sentations of real reductive Lie groups [Atl]. The 19-member team focused on E8 first,
because everyone respects the formidable E8. By 2007, a computer had completed the
character table of E8. Since there are infinitely many irreducible characters and each
character is an analytic function on (a dense open subset of) the group, it is not clear
without much further explanation what it might even mean for a computer to output
the full character table as a 60 gigabyte file [Ada11]. What is significant about this
work is that it brings the computer to bear on some abstract parts of mathematics that
have been traditionally largely beyond the reach of concrete computational description,
3 I describe the families over C. Each complex Lie group has a finite number of further real
forms.
4 For decades, E8 has stood for the ultimate in speculative physics, whether in heterotic string
theory or a “theory of everything.” Last year, E8 took a turn toward the real world, when E8
calculations predicted neutron scattering experiments with a cobalt niobate magnet [BG11].
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including infinite dimensional representations of Lie groups, intersection cohomology
and perverse sheaves. Vogan’s account of this computational project was awarded the
2011 Conant Prize of the AMS [Vog07].
While on the topic of computation and representation theory, I cannot resist a di-
gression into the P versus NP problem, the most fundamental unsolved problem in
mathematics. In my opinion, attempts to settle P versus NP from the axioms of ZFC are
ultimately as ill-fated as Hilbert’s program in the foundations of math (which nonethe-
less spurred valuable partial results such as the decision procedures of Presburger and
Tarski), but if I were to place faith anywhere, it would be in Mulmuley’s program in
geometric complexity theory. The program invokes geometric invariant theory and rep-
resentation theoretic invariants to tease apart complexity classes: if the irreducible con-
stituents of modules canonically associated with two complexity classes are different,
then the two complexity classes are distinct. In this approach, the determinant and per-
manent of a matrix are chosen as the paradigms of what is easy and hard to compute,
opening up complexity theory to a rich algebro-geometric structure [Mul11], [For09].
1.18 future computer proofs
Certain problems are natural candidates for computer proof: the Kelvin problem by
the enumeration of the combinatorial topology of possible counterexamples; the search
for a counterexample to the two-dimensional Jacobian conjecture through the minimal
model program [Bor09]; resolution of singularities in positive characteristic through
an automated search for numerical quantities that decrease under suitable blowup; ex-
istence of a projective plane of order 12 by constraint satisfaction programming; the
optimality proof of the best known packing of tetrahedra in three dimensions [CEG10];
Steiner’s isoperimetric conjecture (1841) for the icosahedron [Ste41]; and the Reinhardt
conjecture through nonlinear optimization [Hal11]. But proceed with caution! Check-
ing on our zeal for brute computation, computer-generated patterns can sometimes fail
miserably. For example, the sequence:⌈
2
21/n − 1
⌉
−
⌊
2n
log 2
⌋
, n = 1, 2, 3, . . .
starts out as the zero sequence, but remarkably first gives a nonzero value when n
reaches 777, 451, 915, 729, 368 and then again when n = 140, 894, 092, 055, 857, 794.
See [Sta07].
At the close of this first section, we confess that a survey of mathematics in the
age of the Turing machine is a reckless undertaking, particularly if it almost completely
neglects software products and essential mathematical algorithms – the Euclidean al-
gorithm, Newton’s method, Gaussian elimination, fast Fourier transform, simplex algo-
rithm, sorting, Scho¨nhage-Strassen, and many more. A starting point for the exploration
of mathematical software is KNOPPIX/Math, a bootable DVD with over a hundred free
mathematical software products (Figure 15) [Ham08]. Sage alone has involved over 200
developers and includes dozens of other packages, providing an open-source Python
scripted alternative to computer algebra systems such as Maple and Mathematica.
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TEX Active-DVI, AUCTEX, TEXmacs, Kile, WhizzyTEX
computer algebra Axiom, CoCoA4, GAP, Macaulay2, Maxima,
PARI/GP, Risa/Asir, Sage, Singular, Yacas
numerical calc Octave, Scilab, FreeFem++, Yorick
visualization 3D-XplorMath-J, Dynagraph, GANG, Geomview,
gnuplot, JavaView, K3DSurf
geometry C.a.R, Dr.Geo, GeoGebra, GEONExT, KidsCindy, KSEG
programming CLISP, Eclipse, FASM, Gauche, GCC, Haskell, Lisp
Prolog, Guile, Lazarus, NASM, Objective Caml,
Perl, Python, Ruby, Squeak
Fig. 15. Some free mathematical programs on the Knoppix/Math DVD [Ham08].
2 Computer Proof
Proof assistants represent the best effort of logicians, computer scientists, and mathe-
maticians to obtain complete mathematical rigor by computer. This section gives a brief
introduction to proof assistants and describes various recent projects that use them.
The first section described various computer calculations in math, and this section
turns to computer reasoning. I have never been able to get used to it being the math-
ematicians who use computers for calculation and the computers scientists who use
computers for proofs!
2.1 design of proof assistants
A formal proof is a proof that has been checked at the level of the primitive rules of
inference all the way back to the fundamental axioms of mathematics. The number of
primitive inferences is generally so large that it is quite hopeless to construct a formal
proof by hand of anything but theorems of the most trivial nature. McCarthy and de
Bruijn suggested that we program computers to generate formal proofs from high-level
descriptions of the proof. This suggestion has led to the development of proof assistants.
A proof assistant is an interactive computer program that enables a user to generate
a formal proof from its high-level description. Some examples of theorems that have
been formally verified by proof assistants appear in Figure 16. The computer code that
implements a proof assistant lists the fundamental axioms of mathematics and gives
procedures that implement each of the rules of logical inference. Within this general
framework, there are enormous variations from one proof assistant to the next. The
feature table in Figure 16 is reproduced from [Wie06]. The columns list different proof
assistants, HOL, Mizar, etc.
Since it is the one that I am most familiar with, my discussion will focus largely
on a particular proof assistant, HOL Light, which belongs to the HOL family of proof
assistants. HOL is an acronym for Higher-Order Logic, which is the underlying logic of
these proof assistants. A fascinating account of the history of HOL appears in [Gor00].
In 1972, R. Milner developed a proof-checking program based on a deductive system
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LCF (for Logic of Computable Functions) that had been designed by Dana Scott a few
years earlier. A long series of innovations (such as goal-directed proofs and tactics,
the ML language, enforcing proof integrity through the type system, conversions and
theorem continuations, rewriting with discrimination nets, and higher-order features)
have led from LCF to HOL.
Year Theorem Proof System Formalizer Traditional Proof
1986 First Incompleteness Boyer-Moore Shankar Go¨del
1990 Quadratic Reciprocity Boyer-Moore Russinoff Eisenstein
1996 Fundamental - of Calculus HOL Light Harrison Henstock
2000 Fundamental - of Algebra Mizar Milewski Brynski
2000 Fundamental - of Algebra Coq Geuvers et al. Kneser
2004 Four Color Coq Gonthier Robertson et al.
2004 Prime Number Isabelle Avigad et al. Selberg-Erdo¨s
2005 Jordan Curve HOL Light Hales Thomassen
2005 Brouwer Fixed Point HOL Light Harrison Kuhn
2006 Flyspeck I Isabelle Bauer-Nipkow Hales
2007 Cauchy Residue HOL Light Harrison classical
2008 Prime Number HOL Light Harrison analytic proof
2012 Odd Order Theorem Coq Gonthier Feit-Thompson
Fig. 16. Examples of Formal Proofs, adapted from [Hal08].
Without going into full detail, I will make a few comments about what some of the
features mean. Different systems can be commended in different ways: HOL Light for
its small trustworthy kernel, Coq for its powerful type system, Mizar for its extensive
libraries, and Isabelle/HOL for its support and usability.
small proof kernel. If a proof assistant is used to check the correctness of proofs, who
checks the correctness of the proof assistant itself? De Bruijn proposed that the proofs
of a proof assistant should be capable of being checked by a short piece of computer
code – something short enough to be checked by hand. For example, the kernel of
the proof assistant HOL Light is just 430 lines of very readable computer code. The
architecture of the system is such that if these 430 lines are bug free then it is incapable5
of generating a theorem that hasn’t been properly proved.
automating calculations. Mathematical argument involves both calculation and proof.
The foundations of logic often specify in detail what constitutes a mathematical proof (a
5 I exaggerate. Section 3 goes into detail about trust in computers.
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small proof kernel (‘proof objects’) + - - + + + + - + - + - + - + - +
calculations can be proved automatically + - + + + + - + + + - + + + + + +
extensible/programmable by the user + - + + - + - - - - - - - + + - +
powerful automation + - + - + + - + - + - + - - + + -
readable proof input files - + - - - + - + - - - + - - - - -
constructive logic supported - - - + - + + - - - + - + + - - +
logical framework - - - - - + - - - - + - - - - - -
typed + + + + - + + - + + - - + + + - +
decidable types + + - + - + + - + + - - + - + - +
dependent types - + + + - - + - - - - - + + - - -
based on higher order logic + - + + - + + - + + - + + + + - -
based on ZFC set theory - + - - - + - - - - + - - - - + -
large mathematical standard library + + + + - + - - - + - - - + - - -
Fig. 17. Features of proof assistants [Wie06]. The table is published by permission from Springer
Science Business Media B.V.
sequence of logical inferences from the axioms), but downgrade calculation to second-
class status, requiring every single calculation to undergo a cumbersome translation
into logic. Some proof assistants allow reflection (sometimes implausibly attributed to
Poincare´), which admits as proof the output from a verified algorithm (bypassing the
expansive translation into logic of each separate execution of the algorithm) [Poi52,
p. 4], [Bar07].
constructive logic. The law of excluded middle φ ∨ ¬φ is accepted in classical logic,
but rejected in constructive logic. A proof assistant may be constructive or classical.
A box (A Mathematical Gem) shows how HOL Light becomes classical through the
introduction of an axiom of choice.
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A Mathematical Gem – Proving the Excluded Middle
The logic of HOL Light is intuitionistic until the axiom of choice is introduced and
classical afterwards. By a result of Diononescu [Bee85], choice and extensionality
imply the law of excluded middle:
φ ∨ ¬φ.
The proof is such a gem that I have chosen to include it as the only complete proof
in this survey article. Consider the two sets of booleans
P1 = {x | (x = false) ∨ ((x = true) ∧ φ)} and
P2 = {x | (x = true) ∨ ((x = false) ∧ φ))}.
The sets are evidently nonempty, because false ∈ P1 and true ∈ P2. By choice, we
may pick x1 ∈ P1 and x2 ∈ P2; and by the definition of P1 and P2:
(x1 = false) ∨ (x1 = true), (x2 = false) ∨ (x2 = true).
We may break the proof of the excluded middle into four cases, depending on the
two possible truth values of each of x1 and x2.
Cases (x1, x2) = (true, true), (x1, x2) = (true, false): By the definition of P1, if x1 =
true, then φ, so φ ∨ ¬φ.
Case (x1, x2) = (false, false): Similarly, by the definition of P2, if x2 = false, then φ,
so also φ ∨ ¬φ.
Case (x1, x2) = (false, true): If φ, then P1 = P2, and the choices x1 and x2 reduce to
a single choice x1 = x2, which contradicts (x1, x2) = (false, true). Hence φ implies
false; which by the definition of negation gives ¬φ, so also φ ∨ ¬φ. Q.E.D.
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logical framework. Many different systems of logic arise in computer science. In some
proof assistants the logic is fixed. Other proof assistants are more flexible, allowing
different logics to be plugged in and played with. The more flexible systems implement
a meta-language, a logical framework, that gives support for the implementation of
multiple logics. Within a logical framework, the logic and axioms of a proof assistant
can themselves be formalized, and machine translations6 can be constructed between
different foundations of mathematics [IR11].
type theory. Approaching the subject of formal proofs as a mathematician whose prac-
tice was shaped by Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, I first treated types as nothing more
than convenient identifying labels (such real number, natural number, list of integers,
or boolean) attached to terms, like the PLU stickers on fruit that get peeled away before
consumption. Types are familiar from programming languages as a way of identifying
what data structure is what. In the simple type system of HOL Light, to each term is
affixed a unique type, which is either a primitive type (such as the boolean type bool),
a type variable (A, B,C, . . .), or inductively constructed from other types with the arrow
constructor (A → B, A → (bool → C), etc.). There is also a way to create subtypes of
existing types. If the types are interpreted naively as sets, then x:A asserts that the term
x is a member of A, and f : A → B asserts that f is a member of A → B, the set of
functions from A to B.
In untyped set theory, it is possible to ask ridiculous questions such as whether the
real number pi = 3.14 . . ., when viewed as a raw set, is a finite group. In fact, in a
random exploration of set theory, like a monkey composing sonnets at the keyboard,
ridiculous questions completely overwhelm all serious content. Types organize data on
the computer in meaningful ways to cut down on the static noise in the system. The
question about pi and groups is not well-typed and cannot be asked. Russell’s paradox
also disappears: X < X is not well-typed. For historical reasons, this is not surprising:
Russell and Whitehead first introduced types to overcome the paradoxes of set theory,
and from there, through Church, they passed into computer science.
Only gradually have I come to appreciate the significance of a comprehensive theory
of types. The type system used by a proof assistant determines to a large degree how
much of a proof the user must contribute and how much the computer automates behind
the scenes. The type system is decidable if there is a decision procedure to determine
the type of each term.
A type system is dependent if a type can depend on another term. For example,
Euclidean space Rn, depends on its dimension n. For this reason, Euclidean space is
most naturally implemented in a proof assistant as a dependent type. In a proof assistant
such as HOL Light that does not have dependent types, extra work is required to develop
a Euclidean space library.
6 My long term Flyspeck project seeks to give a formal proof of the Kepler conjecture [Hal05a].
This project is now scattered between different proof assistants. Logical framework based
translations between proof assistants gives me hope that an automated tool may assemble the
scattered parts of the project.
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2.2 propositions as types
I mentioned the naive interpretation of each type A as a set and a term x:A as a member
of the set. A quite different interpretation of types has had considerable influence in
the design of proof assistants. In this “terms-as-proofs” view, a type A represents a
proposition and a term x:A represents a proof of the proposition A. A term with an
arrow type, f : A → B, can be used to to construct a proof f (x) of B from a proof x of
A. In this interpretation, the arrow is logical implication.
A further interpretation of types comes from programming languages. In this “terms-
as-computer-programs” view, a term is a program and the type is its specification. For
example, f : A → B is a program f that takes input of type A and returns a value of
type B.
By combining the “terms as proofs” with the “terms as computer programs” in-
terpretations, we get the famous Curry-Howard correspondence that identifies proofs
with computer programs and identifies each proposition with the type of a computer
program. For example, the most fundamental rule of logic,
A, A→ B
B
, (modus ponens)
(from A and A-implies-B follows B) is identified with the function application in a com-
puter program; from x:A and f : A → B we get f (x):B. To follow the correspondence
is to extract an executable computer program from a mathematical proof. The Curry-
Howard correspondence has been extremely fruitful, with a multitude of variations,
running through a gamut of proof systems in logic and identifying each with a suitable
programming domain.
2.3 proof tactics
In some proof assistants, the predominant proof style is a backward style proof. The
user starts with a goal, which is a statement to be proved. In interactive steps, the user
reduces the goal to successively simpler goals until there is nothing left to prove.
Each command that reduces a goal to simpler goals is called a tactic. For example, in
the proof assistant HOL Light, there are about 100 different commands that are tactics or
higher-order operators on tactics (called tacticals). Figure 18 shows the most commonly
used proof commands in HOL Light. The most common tactic is rewriting, which takes
a theorem of the form a = b and substitutes b for an occurrence of a in the goal.
In the Coq proof assistant, the tactic system has been streamlined to an extraordi-
nary degree by the SSReflect package, becoming a model of efficiency for other proof
assistants to emulate, with an extremely small number of tactics such as the move tac-
tic for bookkeeping, one for rewriting, ones for forward and backward reasoning, and
another for case analysis [GM11], [GMT11]. The package also provides support for
exploiting the computational content of proofs, by integrating logical reasoning with
efficient computational algorithms.
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name purpose usage
THEN combine two tactics into one 37.2%
REWRITE use a = b to replace a with b in goal 14.5%
MP TAC introduce a previously proved theorem 4.0%
SIMP TAC rewriting with conditionals 3.1%
MATCH MP TAC reduce a goal b to a, given a theorem a =⇒ b 3.0%
STRIP TAC (bookkeeping) unpackage a bundled goal 2.9%
MESON TAC apply first-order reasoning to solve the goal 2.6%
REPEAT repeat a tactic as many times as possible 2.5%
DISCH TAC (bookkeeping) move hypothesis to the assumption list 2.3%
EXISTS TAC instantiate an existential goal ∃x . . . 2.3%
GEN TAC instantiate a universal goal ∀x . . . 1.4%
Fig. 18. A few of the most common proof commands in the HOL Light proof assistant
2.4 first-order automated reasoning
Many proof assistants support some form of automated reasoning to relieve the user
of doing rote logic by hand. For example, Table 18 lists meson (an acronym for Love-
land’s Model Elimination procedure), which is HOL Light’s tactic for automated rea-
soning [Har09, Sec. 3.15], [Har96]. The various automated reasoning tools are gener-
ally first-order theorem provers. The classic resolution algorithm for first-order reason-
ing is illustrated in a box (Proof by Resolution).
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Proof by Resolution
Resolution is the granddaddy of automated reasoning in first-order logic. The reso-
lution rule takes two disjunctions
P ∨ A and ¬P′ ∨ B
and concludes
A′ ∨ B′,
where A′ and B′ are the specializations of A and B, respectively, under the most
general unifier of P and P′. (Examples of this in practice appear below.)
This box presents a rather trivial example of proof by resolution, to deduce the easy
theorem asserting that every infinite set has a member. The example will use the
following notation. Let ∅ be a constant representing the empty set and constant c
representing a given infinite set. We use three unary predicates e, f , i that have
interpretations
e(X) “X is empty”, f (X) “X is finite”, i(X) “X is infinite.”
The binary predicate (∈) denotes set membership. We prove i(c) ⇒ (∃z.z ∈ c) “an
infinite set has a member” by resolution.
To argue by contradiction, we introduce the hypothesis i(c) and the negated conclu-
sion ¬(Z ∈ c) as axioms. Here are the axioms that we allow in the deduction. The
axioms have been preprocessed, stripped of quantifiers, and written as a disjunction
of literals. Upper case letters are variables.
Axiom Informal Description
1. i(c) Assumption of desired theorem.
2. ¬(Z ∈ c) Negation of conclusion of desired theorem.
3. e(X) ∨ (u(X) ∈ X) A nonempty set has a member.
4. e(∅) The empty set is empty.
5. f (∅) The empty set is finite.
6. ¬i(Y) ∨ ¬ f (Y) A set is not both finite and infinite.
7. ¬e(U) ∨ ¬e(V) ∨ ¬i(U) ∨ i(V) Weak indistinguishability of empty sets.
Here are the resolution inferences from this list of axioms. The final step obtains the
desired contradiction.
Inference Resolvant
8. (resolving 2,3, unifying X with c and u(X) with Z) e(c)
9. (resolving 7,8, unifying U with c) ¬e(V) ∨ ¬i(c) ∨ i(V)
10. (resolving 1,9) ¬e(V) ∨ i(V)
11. (resolving 4,10, unifying V with ∅) i(∅)
12. (resolving 6,11, unifying Y with ∅) ¬ f (∅)
13. (resolving 12,5) ⊥
Q.E.D.
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Writing about first-order automated reasoning, Huet and Paulin-Mohring [BC04]
describe the situation in the early 1970s as a “catastrophic state of the art.” “The stan-
dard mode of use was to enter a conjecture and wait for the computer’s memory to ex-
haust its capacity. Answers were obtained only in exceptionally trivial cases.” They go
on to describe numerous developments (Knuth-Bendix, LISP, rewriting technologies,
LCF, ML, Martin-Lo¨f type theory, NuPrl, Curry-Howard correspondence, dependent
types, etc.) that led up to the Coq proof assistant. These developments led away from
first-order theorem proving with its “thousands of unreadable logical consequences” to
a highly structured approach to theorem proving in Coq.
First-order theorem proving has developed significantly over the years into sophis-
ticated software products. They are no longer limited to “exceptionally limited cases.”
Many different software products compete in an annual competition (CASC), to see
which can solve difficult first-order problems the fastest. The LTB (large theory batch)
division of the competition includes problems with thousands of axioms [PSST08]. Sig-
nificantly, this is the same order of magnitude as the total number of theorems in a proof
assistant. What this means is that a first-order theorem provers have reached the stage
of development that they might be able to give fully automated proofs of new theorems
in a proof assistant, working from the full library of previously proved theorems.
sledgehammer. The Sledgehammer tactic is Paulson’s implementation of this idea of
full automation in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [Pau10]. As the name ‘Sledgeham-
mer’ suggests, the tactic is all-purpose and powerful, but demolishes all higher math-
ematical structure, treating every goal as a massive unstructured problem in first-order
logic. If L is the set of all theorems in the Isabelle/HOL library, and g is a goal, it would
be possible to hand off the problem L =⇒ g to a first-order theorem prover. However,
success rates are dramatically improved, when the theorems in L are first assessed by
heuristic rules for their likely relevance for the goal g, in a process called relevance
filtering. This filtering is used to reduce L to an axiom set L′ of a few hundred theorems
that are deemed most likely to prove g.
The problem L′ =⇒ g is stripped of type information, converted to a first-order, and
fed to first-order theorem provers. Experiments indicate that it is more effective to feed
a problem in parallel into multiple first-order provers for a five-second burst than to
hand the problem to the best prover (Vampire) for a prolonged attack [Pau10], [BN10].
When luck runs in your favor, one of the first-order theorem provers finds a proof.
The reconstruction of a formal proof from a first-order proof can encounter hurdles.
For one thing, when type information is stripped from the problem (which is done to
improve performance), soundness is lost. “In unpublished work by Urban, MaLARea
[a machine learning program for relevance ranking] easily proved the full Sledgeham-
mer test suite by identifying an inconsistency in the translated lemma library; once
MaLARea had found the inconsistency in one proof, it easily found it in all the oth-
ers” [Pau10], [Urb07]. Good results have been obtained in calling the first-order prover
repeatedly to find a smaller set of axioms L′′ ⊂ L′ that imply the goal g. A manage-
ably sized set L′′ is then passed to the metis tactic7 in Isabelle/HOL, which constructs
a formal proof L′′ =⇒ g from scratch.
7 Metis is a program that automates first-order reasoning [Met].
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Bo¨hme and Nipkow took 1240 proof goals that appear in several diverse theories
of the Isabelle/HOL system and ran sledgehammer on all of them [BN10]. The results
are astounding. The success rate (of obtaining fully reconstructed formal proofs) when
three different first-order provers run for two-minutes each was 48%. The proofs of
these same goals by hand might represent years of human labor, now fully automated
through a single new tool.
Sledgehammer has led to a new style of theorem proving, in which the user is pri-
marily responsible for stating the goals. In the final proof script, there is no explicit men-
tion of sledgehammer. Metis proves the goals, with sledgehammer operating silently in
the background to feed metis with whatever theorems it needs. For example, a typical
proof script might contain lines such as [Pau10]
hence “x ⊆ space M”
by (metis sets into space lambda system sets)
The first line is the goal that the user types. The second line has been automatically
inserted into the proof script by the system, with the relevant theorems sets, into
etc. selected by Sledgehammer.
2.5 computation in proof assistants.
One annoyance of formal proof systems is the difficulty in locating the relevant theo-
rems. At last count, HOL Light had about 14, 000 theorems and nearly a thousand pro-
cedures for proof construction. Larger developments, such as Mizar, have about twice
as many theorems. Good search tools have somewhat relieved the burden of locating
theorems in the libraries. However, as the formal proof systems continue to grow, it
becomes ever more important to find ways to use theorems without mentioning them
by name.
As an example of a feature which commendably reduces the burden of memoriz-
ing long lists of theorem names, I mention the REAL RING command in HOL Light,
which is capable of proving any system of equalities and inequalities that holds over an
arbitrary integral domain. For example, I can give a one-line formal proof of an isogeny
(x1, y1) 7→ (x2, y2) of elliptic curves: if we have a point on the first elliptic curve:
y21 = 1 + ax
2
1 + bx
4
1,
x2y1 = x1,
y2y21 = (1 − bx41),
y1 , 0
then (x2, y2) lies on a second elliptic curve
y22 = 1 + a
′x22 + b
′x42,
where a′ = −2a and b′ = a2 − 4b. In the proof assistant, the input of the statement is
as economical as what I have written here. We expect computer algebra systems to be
capable of checking identities like this, but to my amazement, I found it easier to check
this isogeny in HOL Light than to check it in Mathematica.
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The algorithm works in the following manner. A universally quantified system of
equalities and inequalities holds over all integral domains if and only if it holds over all
fields. By putting the formula in conjunctive normal form, it is enough to prove a finite
number of polynomial identities of the form:
(p1 = 0) ∨ · · · ∨ (pn = 0) ∨ (q1 , 0) ∨ · · · ∨ (qk , 0). (2)
An element in a field is zero, if and only if it is not a unit. Thus we may rewrite each
polynomial equality pi = 0 as an equivalent inequality 1 − pizi , 0. Thus, without
loss of generality, we may assume that n = 0; so that all disjuncts are inequalities. The
formula (2) is logically equivalent to
(q1 = 0) ∧ · · · ∧ (qk = 0) =⇒ false.
In other words, it is enough to prove that the zero set of the ideal I = (q1, . . . , qn) is
empty. For this, we may use Gro¨bner bases8 to prove that 1 ∈ I, to certify that the zero
set is empty.
Gro¨bner basis algorithms give an example of a certificate-producing procedure. A
formal proof is obtained in two stages. In the first stage an unverified algorithm pro-
duces a certificate. In the second stage the proof assistant analyzes the certificate to
confirm the results. Certificate-producing procedures open the door to external tools,
which tremendously augment the power of the proof assistant. The meson is procedure
implemented this way, as a search followed by verification. Other certificate-producing
procedures in use in proof assistants are linear programming, SAT, and SMT.
Another praiseworthy project is Kaliszyk and Wiedijk’s implementation of a com-
puter algebra system on top of the proof assistant HOL Light. It combines the ease of
use of computer algebra with the rigor of formal proof [KW07]. Even with its nota-
tional idiosyncrasies (& and # as a markers of real numbers, Cx as a marker of complex
numbers, ii for
√−1, and -- for unary negation), it is the kind of product that I can
imagine finding widespread adoption by mathematicians. Some of the features of the
system are shown in Figure 19.
2.6 formalization of finite group theory
The Feit-Thompson theorem, or odd-order theorem, is one of the most significant theo-
rems of the twentieth century. (For his work, Thompson was awarded the three highest
honors in the mathematical world: the Fields Medal, the Abel Prize, and the Wolf Prize.)
The Feit-Thompson theorem states that every finite simple group has even order, except
for cyclic groups of prime order. The proof, which runs about 250 pages, is extremely
technical. The Feit-Thompson theorem launched the endeavor to classify all finite sim-
ple groups, a monumental undertaking that consumed an entire generation of group
theorists.
Gonthier’s team has formalized the proof of the Feit-Thompson theorem [Gon12].
To me as a mathematician, nothing else that has been done by the formal proof com-
munity compares in splendor to the formalization of this theorem. Finally, we are doing
8 Kaliszyk’s benchmarks suggest that the Gro¨bner basis algorithm in the proof assistant Isabelle
runs about twenty times faster than that of HOL Light.
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In1 := (3 + 4 DIV 2) EXP 3 * 5 MOD 3
Out1 := 250
In2 := vector [&2; &2] - vector [&1; &0] + vec 1
Out2 := vector [&2; &3]
In3 := diff (diff (\x. &3 * sin (&2 * x) + &7 + exp (exp x)))
Out3 := \x. exp x pow 2 * exp (exp x) + exp x * exp (exp x) + -- &12 * sin (&2 * x)
In4 := N (exp (&1)) 10
Out4 := #2.7182818284 + ... (exp (&1)) 10 F
In5 := 3 divides 6 /\ EVEN 12
Out5 := T
In6 := Re ((Cx (&3) + Cx (&2) * ii) / (Cx (-- &2) + Cx (&7) * ii))
Out6 := &8 / &53
Fig. 19. Interaction with a formally verified computer algebra system [KW07].
real mathematics! The project formalized two books, [BG94] and [Pet00], as well as a
significant body of background material.
The structures of abstract algebra – groups, rings, modules, algebras, algebraically
closed fields and so forth – have all been laid out formally in the Coq proof assistant.
Analogous algebraic hierarchies appear in systems such as OpenAxiom, MathScheme,
Mizar, and Isabelle; and while some of these hierarchies are elaborate, none have delved
so deeply as the development for Feit-Thompson. It gets multiple abstract structures to
work coherently together in a formal setting. “The problem is not so much in capturing
the semantics of each individual construct but rather in having all the concepts working
together well” [GMR07].
Structure finGroupType Type := FinGroupType {
element :> finType;
1 : element;
−1 : element → element;
* : element → element → element;
unitP : ∀ x, 1 ∗ x = x;
invP : ∀ x, x−1 ∗ x = 1;
mulP : ∀ x1 x2 x3, x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ x3) = (x1 ∗ x2) ∗ x3
}.
Fig. 20. The structure of a finite group [GMR07].
The definition of a finite group in Coq is similar to the textbook definition, expressed
in types and structures (Figure 20). It declares a finite type called element that is the
group carrier or domain. The rest of the structure specifies a left-unit element 1, a left-
inverse −1 and an associative binary operation (∗).
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Other aspects of Gonthier’s recent work can be found at [Gon11], [GGMR09],
[BGBP08]. Along different lines, a particularly elegant organization of abstract alge-
bra and category theory is obtained with type classes [SvdW11].
2.7 homotopy type theory
The simple type theory of HOL Light is adequate for real analysis, where relatively few
types are needed – one can go quite far with natural numbers, real numbers, booleans,
functions between these types, and a few functionals. However, the dependent type
theory of Coq is better equipped than HOL Light for the hierarchy of structures from
groups to rings of abstract algebra. But even Coq’s type theory is showing signs of strain
in dealing with abstract algebra. For instance, an unpleasant limitation of Coq’s theory
of types is that it lacks the theorem of extensionality for functions: if two functions take
the same value for every argument, it does not follow that the two functions are equal.9
The gymnastics to solve the problem of function extensionality in the context of the
Feit-Thompson theorem are found in [GMR07].
A lack of function extensionality is an indication that equality in type theory may
be misconceived. Recently, homotopy type theory has exploded onto the scene, which
turns to homotopy theory and higher categories as models of type theory [HTT11]. It is
quite natural to interpret a dependent type (viewed as a family of types parametrized by
a second type) topologically as a fibration (viewed as a family of fibers parametrized
by a base space) [AW09]. Voevodsky took the homotopical notions of equality and
equivalence and translated them back into type theory, obtaining the univalence axiom
of type theory, which posits what types are equivalent [Voe11], [PW12], [KLV12b],
[KLV12a]. One consequence of the univalence axiom is the theorem of extensionality
for functions. Another promising sign for computer theorem-proving applications is
that the univalence axiom appears to preserve the computable aspects of type theory
(unlike for instance, the axiom of choice which makes non-computable choices) [LH].
We may hope that some day there may be a back infusion of type-theoretic proofs into
homotopy theory.
2.8 language of mathematics
Ganesalingam’s thesis is the most significant linguistic study of the language of math-
ematics to date [Gan09], [Gan10]. Ganesalingam was awarded the 2011 Beth Prize for
the best dissertation in Logic, Language, or Information. Although this research is still
at an early stage, it suggests that the mechanical translation of mathematical prose into
formal computer syntax that faithfully represents the semantics is a realistic hope for
the not-to-distant future.
The linguistic problems surrounding the language of mathematics differ in various
ways from those of say standard English. A mathematical text introduces new defini-
tions and notations as it progresses, whereas in English, the meaning of words is gen-
erally fixed from the outset. Mathematical writing freely mixes English with symbolic
expressions. At the same time, mathematics is self-contained in a way that English can
9 HOL Light avoids this problem by positing extensionality as a mathematical axiom.
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never be; to understand English is to understand the world. By contrast, the meaning in
a carefully written mathematical text is determined by Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (or
your favorite foundational system).
Ganesalingam’s analysis of notational syntax is general enough to treat quite gen-
eral mixfix operations generalizing infix (e.g. +), postfix (e.g. factorial !), and prefix
(cos). He analyzes subscripted infix operators (such as a semidirect product H oα N),
multi-symboled operators (such as the three-symboled [ : ] operator for the de-
gree [K : k] of a field-extension), prefixed words (R-module), text within formulas
{(a, b) | a is a factor of b}, unusual script placement LG, chained relations a < b < c,
ellipses 1 + 2 + · · · + n, contracted forms x, y ∈ N, and exposed formulas (such as “for
all x > 0, . . . ” to mean “for all x, if x > 0, then . . . ”).
The thesis treats what is called the formal mode of the language of mathematics
– the language divested of all the informal side-remarks. The syntax is treated as a
context-free grammar, and the semantics are analyzed with a variant of discourse rep-
resentation theory, which in my limited understanding is something very similar to
first-order logic; but different in one significant aspect: it provides a theory of pronoun
references; or put more precisely, a theory of what may be the “legitimate antecedent
for anaphor.”
A major issue in Ganesalingam’s thesis is the resolution of ambiguity. For example,
in the statement
P is prime (3)
the term ‘prime’ may mean prime number, prime ideal, or prime manifold. His solution
is to attach type information to terms (in the sense of types as discussed above). The
reading of (3) depends on the type of P, variously a number, a subset of a ring, or a
manifold. In this analysis, resolution of ambiguity becomes a task of a type inference
engine.
Because of the need for type information, Ganesalingam raises questions about the
suitability of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as the ultimate semantics of mathematics. A
number of formal-proof researchers have been arguing in favor of typed foundational
systems for many years. It is encouraging that there is remarkable convergence between
Ganesalingam’s linguistic analysis, innovations in the Mizar proof assistant, and the de-
velopment of abstract algebra in Coq. For example, in various camps we find ellipses
(aka big operators), mixfix operators, type inference, missing argument inference mech-
anisms, and so forth. Also see [Hoe11] and [Pas07]. Mathematical abuses of notation
have turned out to be rationally construed after all!
2.9 looking forward
Let’s take the long term view that the longest proofs of the last century are of insignifi-
cant complexity compared to what awaits. Why would we limit our creative endeavors
to 10, 000 page proofs when we have tools that allow us to go to a million pages or
more? So far it is rare for a computer proof has defied human understanding. No human
has been able to make sense of an unpublished 1500 page computer-generated proof
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about Bruck loops10 [PS08]. Eventually, we will have to content ourselves with fables
that approximate the content of a computer proof in terms that humans can comprehend.
Turing’s great theoretical achievements were to delineate what a computer can do
in the concept of a universal Turing machine, to establish limits to what a computer
can do in his solution to the Entscheidungsproblem, and yet to advocate nonetheless
that computers might imitate all intelligent activity. It remains a challenging research
program: to show that one limited branch of mathematics, computation, might stand for
all mathematical activity.
In the century since Turing’s birth, the computer has become so ubiquitous and the
idea of computer as brain so commonplace that it bears repeating that we must still
think very long and hard about how to construct a computer that can imitate a living,
thinking mathematician.
Proof assistant technology is still under development in labs; far more is needed
before it finds widespread adoption. Ask any proof assistant researcher, and you will
get a sizable list of features to implement: more automation, better libraries, and better
user interfaces! Wiedijk discusses ten design questions for the next generation of proof
assistants, including the type system, which axiomatic foundations of mathematics to
use, and the language of proof scripts [Wie10b].
Everyone actively involved in proof formalization experiences the incessant barrage
of problems that have been solved multiple times before and that other users will have
to solve multiple times again, because the solutions are not systematic. To counter this,
the DRY “Don’t Repeat Yourself” principle of programming, formulated in [HT00],
has been carried to a refreshing extreme by Carette in his proof assistant design. For
example, in his designs, a morphism is defined only once, eliminating the need for
separate definitions of a morphism of modules, of algebras, of varieties, and so forth.
Carette’s other design maxims include “math has a lot of structure; use it” and “abstract
mathematical structures produce the best code” [CES11]. Indeed, mathematicians turn
to abstraction to bring out relevant structure. This applies to computer code and math-
ematical reasoning alike. American Math Society guidelines for mathematical writing
apply directly to the computer: “omit any computation which is routine. . . . Merely indi-
cate the starting point, describe the procedure, and state the outcome” [DCF+62] (except
that computations should be automated rather than entirely omitted).
We need to separate the concerns of construction, maintenance, and presentation
of proofs. The construction of formal proofs from a mathematical text is an extremely
arduous process, and yet I often hear proposals that would increase the labor needed to
formalize a proof, backed by secondary goals such as ease of maintenance, elegance of
presentation, fidelity to printed texts, and pedagogy.11 Better to avail ourselves of au-
tomation that was not available in the day of paper proofs, and to create new mathemat-
10 The theorem states that Bruck loops with abelian inner mapping group are centrally nilpotent
of class two.
11 To explain the concept of separation of concerns, Dijkstra tells the story of an old initiative to
create a new programming language that failed miserably because the designers felt that the
new language had to look just like FORTRAN to gain broad acceptance. “The proper technique
is clearly to postpone the concerns for general acceptance until you have reached a result of
such a quality that it deserves acceptance” [Dij82].
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ical styles suited to the medium, with proofs that variously look like a computer-aided
design session, a functional program, or a list of hypotheses as messages in gmail. The
most pressing concern is to reduce the skilled labor it takes a user to construct a formal
proof from a pristine mathematical text.
The other concerns of proof transformation should be spun off as separate research
activities: refactored proofs, proof scripts optimized for execution time, translations
into other proof assistants, natural language translations, natural language abstracts,
probabilistically checkable proofs, searchable metadata extracts, and proof mining.
For a long time, proof formalization technology was unable to advance beyond the
mathematics of the 19th century, picking classical gems such as the Jordan curve the-
orem, the prime number theorem, or Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in arithmetic pro-
gressions. With the Feit-Thompson theorem, formalization has risen to a new level, by
taking on the work of a Fields medalist.
At this level, there is an abundant supply of mathematical theorems to choose from.
A Dutch research agenda lists the formalization of Fermat’s Last Theorem as the first
in a list of “Ten Challenging Research Problems for Computer Science” [Ber05]. Hes-
selink predicts that this one formalization project alone will take about “fifty years, with
a very wide margin.” Small pieces of the proof of Fermat, such as class field theory, the
Langlands-Tunnell theorem, or the arithmetic theory of elliptic curves would be a fitting
starting point. The aim is to develop technologies until formal verification of theorems
becomes routine at the level of Atiyah-Singer index theorem, Perelman’s proof of the
Poincare´ conjecture, the Green-Tao theorem on primes in arithmetic progression, or
Ngoˆ’s proof of the fundamental lemma.
Starting from the early days of Newell, Shaw, and Simon’s experiments, researchers
have dreamed of a general-purpose mechanical problem solver. Generations later, af-
ter untold trials, it remains an unwavering dream. I will end this section with one of
the many proposals for a general problem solving algorithm. Kurzweil breaks general
problem solving into three phases:
1. State your problem in precise terms.
2. Map out the contours of the solution space by traversing it recursively, within the
limits of available computational resources.
3. Unleash an evolutionary algorithm to configure a neural net to tackle the remaining
leaves of the tree.
He concludes, “And if all of this doesn’t work, then you have a difficult problem in-
deed” [Kur99]. Yes, indeed we do! Some day, energy and persistence will conquer.
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3 Issues of Trust
We all have first-hand experience of the bugs and glitches of software. We exchange sto-
ries when computers run amok. Science recently reported the story of a textbook “The
Making of a Fly” that was on sale at Amazon for more than 23 million dollars [Sci11].
The skyrocketing price was triggered by an automated bidding war between two sellers,
who let their algorithms run unsupervised. The textbook’s author, Berkeley professor
Peter Lawrence, said he hoped that the price would reach “a billion.” An overpriced
textbook on the fly is harmless, except for students who have it as a required text.
But what about the Flash Crash on Wall Street that brought a 600 point plunge in the
Dow Jones in just 5 minutes at 2:41 pm on May 6, 2010? According to the New York
Times [NYT10], the flash crash started when a mutual fund used a computer algorithm
“to sell $4.1 billion in futures contracts.” The algorithm was designed to sell “without
regard to price or time.. . . [A]s the computers of the high-frequency traders traded [fu-
tures] contracts back and forth, a ‘hot potato’ effect was created.” When computerized
traders backed away from the unstable markets, share prices of major companies fluc-
tuated even more wildly. “Over 20,000 trades across more than 300 securities were ex-
ecuted at prices more than 60% away from their values just moments before” [SEC10].
Throughout the crash, computers followed algorithms to a T, to the havoc of the global
economy.
3.1 mathematical error
Why use computers to verify mathematics? The simple answer is that carefully imple-
mented proof checkers make fewer errors than mathematicians (except J.-P. Serre).
Incorrect proofs of correct statements are so abundant that they are impossible to
catalogue. Ralph Boas, former executive editor of Math Reviews, once remarked that
proofs are wrong “half the time” [Aus08]. Kempe’s claimed proof of the four-color
theorem stood for more than a decade before Heawood refuted it [Mac01, p. 115].
“More than a thousand false proofs [of Fermat’s Last Theorem] were published between
1908 and 1912 alone” [Cor10]. Many published theorems are like the hanging chad
ballots of the 2000 U.S. presidential election, with scrawls too ambivalent for a clear yea
or nay. One mathematician even proposed to me that a new journal is needed that unlike
the others only publishes reliable results. Euclid gave us a method, but even he erred in
the proof of the very first proposition of the Elements when he assumed without proof
that two circles, each passing through the other’s center, must intersect. The concept
that is needed to repair the gap in Euclid’s reasoning is an intermediate value theorem.
This defect was not remedied until Hilbert’s ‘Foundations of Geometry.’
Examples of widely accepted proofs of false or unprovable statements show that
our methods of proof-checking are far from perfect. Lagrange thought he had a proof
of the parallel postulate, but had enough doubt in his argument to withhold it from
publication. In some cases, entire schools have become sloppy, such as the Italian
school of algebraic geometry or real analysis before the revolution in rigor towards
the end of the nineteenth century. Plemelj’s 1908 accepted solution to Hilbert’s 21st
problem on the monodromy of linear differential equations was refuted in 1989 by
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Bolibruch. Auslander gives the example of a theorem12 published by Waraskiewicz in
1937, generalized by Choquet in 1944, then refuted with a counterexample by Bing in
1948 [Aus08]. Another example is the approximation problem for Sobolev maps be-
tween two manifolds [Bet91], which contains a faulty proof of an incorrect statement.
The corrected theorem appears in [HL03]. Such examples are so plentiful that a Wiki
page has been set up to classify them, with references to longer discussions at Math
Overflow [Wik11], [Ove09], [Ove10].
Theorems that are calculations or enumerations are especially prone to error. Feyn-
man laments, “I don’t notice in the morass of things that something, a little limit or sign,
goes wrong.. . . I have mathematically proven to myself so many things that aren’t true”
[Fey00, p. 885]. Elsewhere, Feynman describes two teams of physicists who carried out
a two-year calculation of the electron magnetic moment and independently arrived at
the same predicted value. When experiment disagreed with prediction, the discrepancy
was eventually traced to an arithmetic error made by the physicists, whose calcula-
tions were not so independent as originally believed [Fey85, p. 117]. Pontryagin and
Rokhlin erred in computing stable homotopy groups of spheres. Little’s tables of knots
from 1885 contains duplicate entries that went undetected until 1974. In enumerative
geometry, in 1848, Steiner counted 7776 plane conics tangent to 5 general plane conics,
when there are actually only 3264. One of the most persistent blunders in the history of
mathematics has been the misclassification (or misdefinition) of convex Archimedean
polyhedra. Time and again, the pseudo rhombic cuboctahedron has been overlooked or
illogically excluded from the classification (Figure 21) [Gru¨11].
Fig. 21. Throughout history, the pseudo rhombic cuboctahedron has been overlooked or misclas-
sified.
3.2 In HOL Light we trust
To what extent can we trust theorems certified by a proof assistant such as HOL Light?
There are various aspects to this question. Is the underlying logic of the system con-
sistent? Are there any programming errors in the implementation of the system? Can a
devious user find ways to create bogus theorems that circumvent logic? Are the under-
lying compilers, operating system, and hardware reliable?
As mentioned above, formal methods represent the best cumulative effort of lo-
gicians, computer scientists and mathematicians over the decades and even over the
12 The claim was that every homogeneous plane continuum is a simple closed curve.
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centuries to create a trustworthy foundation for the practice of mathematics, and by
extension, the practice of science and engineering.
3.3 a network of mutual verification
John Harrison repeats the classical question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes” – who
guards the guards [Har06]? How do we prove the correctness of the prover itself? In
that article, he proves the consistency of the HOL Light logic and the correctness of its
implementation in computer code. He makes this verification in HOL Light itself! To
skirt Go¨del’s theorem, which implies that HOL Light – if consistent – cannot prove its
own consistency, he gives two versions of his proof. The first uses HOL Light to verify
a weakened version of HOL Light that does not have the axiom of infinity. The second
uses a HOL Light with a strengthened axiom of infinity to verify standard HOL Light.
Recently, Adams has implemented a version of HOL called HOL Zero. His system
has the ability to import mechanically proofs that were developed in HOL Light [Ada09].
He imported the self-verification of HOL Light, to obtain an external verification. You
see where this is going. As mechanical translation capabilities are developed for proof
assistants, it becomes possible for different proof assistants to share consistency proofs,
similar to the way that different axiomatic systems give relative consistency proofs of
one another. We are headed in the direction of knowing that if the logic or implemen-
tation of one proof assistant has an error, then all other major proof assistants must fail
in tandem. Other self-verification projects are Coq in Coq (Coc) and ACL2 in ACL2
(Milawa) [Bar98], [Dav09].
3.4 hacking HOL
Of course, every formal verification project is a verification of an abstract model of the
computer code, the computer language, and its semantics. In practice, there are gaps
between the abstract model and implementation.
This leaves open the possibility that a hacker might find ways to create an unau-
thorized theorem; that is, a theorem generated by some means other than the rules of
inference of HOL Logic. Indeed, there are small openings that a hacker can exploit.13
Adams maintains a webpage of known vulnerabilities in his system and offers a cash
bounty to anyone who uncovers a new vulnerability.
These documented vulnerabilities need to be kept in perspective. They lie at the
fringe of the most reliable software products ever designed. Proof assistants are used to
verify the correctness of chips and microcode [Fox03], operating system kernels [KAE+10],
13 For example, strings are mutable in HOL Light’s source language, Objective CAML, allow-
ing theorems to be maliciously altered. Also, Objective CAML has object magic, which is a
way to defeat the type system. These vulnerabilities and all other vulnerabilities that I know
would be detected during translation of the proof from HOL Light to HOL Zero. A stricter
standard is Pollack consistency, which requires a proof assistant to avoid the appearance of
inconsistency [Ada09], [Wie10a]. For example, some proof assistants allow the substitution of
a variable whose name is a meaningless sequence of characters ‘n<0 ∧ 0’ for t in ∃n. t < n
to obtain a Pollack-inconsistency ∃n. n < 0 ∧ 0 < n.
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compilers [Ler06], safety-critical software such as aircraft guidance systems, security
protocols, and mathematical theorems that defeat the usual refereeing process.
Some take the view that nothing short of absolute certainty in mathematics gives
an adequate basis for science. Poincare´ was less exacting14, only demanding the im-
precision of calculation not to exceed experimental error. As Harrison reminds us, “a
foundational death spiral adds little value” [Har10].
3.5 soft errors
Mathematicians often bring up the “cosmic ray argument” against the use of computers
in math. Let’s look at the underlying science.
A soft error in a computer is a transient error that cannot be attributed to permanent
hardware defects nor to bugs in software. Hard errors – errors that can be attributed
to a lasting hardware failure – also occur, but at rates that are ten times smaller than
soft errors [MW04]. Soft errors come from many sources. A typical soft error is caused
by cosmic rays, or rather by the shower of energetic neutrons they produce through
interactions in the earth’s atmosphere. A nucleus of an atom in the hardware can capture
one of these energetic neutrons and throw off an alpha particle, which strikes a memory
circuit and changes the value stored in memory. To the end user, a soft error appears as
a gremlin, a seemingly inexplicable random error that disappears when the computer is
rebooted and the program runs again.
As an example, we will calculate the expected number of soft errors in one of the
mathematical calculations of Section 1.17. The Atlas Project calculation of the E8 char-
acter table was a 77 hour calculation that required 64 gigabytes RAM [Ada07]. Soft
errors rates are generally measured in units of failures-in-time (FIT). One FIT is de-
fined as one error per 109 hours of operation. If we assume a soft error rate of 103 FIT
per Mbit, (which is a typical rate for a modern memory device operating at sea level15
[Tez04]), then we would expect there to be about 40 soft errors in memory during the
calculation:
103 FIT
1 Mbit
·64 GB·77 hours = 10
3 errors
109 hours Mbit
·(64 · 8 · 103 Mbit)·77 hours ≈ 39.4 errors.
This example shows that soft errors can be a realistic concern in mathematical calcula-
tions. (As added confirmation, the E8 calculation has now been repeated about 5 times
with identical results.)
In software that has been thoroughly debugged, soft errors become the most sig-
nificant source of error in computation. Although there are numerous ways to pro-
tect against soft errors with methods such as repeated calculations and error-correcting
codes, hardware redesign carries an economic cost. In fact, soft errors are on the rise
through miniaturization: a smaller circuit generally has a lower capacitance and re-
sponds to less energetic alpha particles than a larger circuit.
14 “Il est donc inutile de demander au calcul plus de pre´cision qu’aux observations; mais on ne
doit pas non plus lui en demander moins” [Poi92].
15 The soft error rate is remarkably sensitive to elevation; a calculation in Denver produces about
three times more soft errors than the same calculation on identical hardware in Boston.
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Soft errors are depressing news in the ultra-reliable world of proof assistants. Alpha
particles rain on perfect and imperfect software alike. In fact, because the number of
soft errors is proportional to the execution time of a calculation, by being slow and
methodical, the probability of a soft error during a calculation inside a proof assistant
can be much higher than the probability when done outside.
Soft errors and susceptibility to hacking have come to be more than a nuisance
to me. They alter my philosophical views of the foundations of mathematics. I am a
computational formalist – a formalist who admits physical limits to the reliability of any
verification process, whether by hand or machine. These limits taint even the simplest
theorems, such as our ability to verify that 1+1 = 2 is a consequence of a set of axioms.
One rogue alpha particle brings all my schemes of perfection to nought. The rigor of
mathematics and the reliability of technology are mutually dependent; math to provide
ever more accurate models of science, and technology to provide ever more reliable
execution of mathematical proofs.
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4 Concluding Remarks
To everyone who has made it this far in this essay, I highly recommend MacKenzie’s
book [Mac01]. It written by a sociologist with a fine sensitivity to mathematics. The
author received the Robert K. Merton Award of the American Sociological Association
in 2003 for this book.
A few years ago, a special issue of the Notices of the AMS presented a general
introduction to formal proofs [Hal08], [Har08], [Gon08], [Wie08]. I also particularly
recommend the body of research articles by Harrison, Gonthier, and Carette.
I thank Adams (both Jeff and Mark), Urban, Carette, Kapulkin, Harrison, and Man-
fredi for conversations about ideas in this article.
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